Research

Moved by my experience as a Venezuelan immigrant, which made me acutely aware of the fragility of democratic institutions, my work as a political philosopher offers theoretical tools to address societal challenges democratically, while countering the threat of authoritarianism and other forms of oppression. To that end, my research combines the tools of democratic theory, philosophy of race, and applied ethics to examine three key issues: climate change, structural racism, and AI regulation.

Dissertation

Climate Democracy: A Philosophical Framework

Summary

The magnitude, complexity of the policies required to address climate change, as well as the urgency to implement them, make it hard to imagine how such policies could be entirely democratic. In fact, some activists, social scientists, and political philosophers have questioned whether democracy can effectively address the climate emergency. Is there a form of “climate democracy” where the deployment of timely and adequate climate policies is fully compatible with substantial democratic principles?

Drawing on the tools of democratic theory and environmental ethics, my dissertation addresses this pressing question. I offer a philosophical framework that lays out the democratic principles that should guide and constrain climate policies while guaranteeing the efficiency and expediency required to address global warming. I approach the question from the perspectives of both governments and social movements and inquire what is democratically legitimate (that is, permissible or justifiable in a democracy) for each of these groups of agents to do in the face of the climate emergency. Such framework could help us to distinguish between cases where there is a tradeoff between climate action and democracy and cases where we can resolve the tension between the two. My project invites us to rethink what democracy means in the 21st century in the face of global challenges and to rethink the limits of climate action.

Further applications

I expect my framework for climate action to provide a blueprint for philosophical theories of social change. When they argue for certain policies or social arrangements, political philosophers tend to neglect the insights of social scientists on how to achieve those outcomes, while social scientists may not fully appreciate the ethical dilemmas embedded in political processes. Yet scientifically-informed normative theories of change would benefit the work of philosophers and social scientists alike. My dissertation experiments with how such a theory would look like. Drawing on political science and environmental social science, I formulate the guidelines to achieve climate goals democratically or, at least, identify the stages at which we are sacrificing democracy for the sake of climate policies. But tensions between democracy and competing political values is likely to arise in other struggles to address structural problems, like systemic racism, economic inequalities, or AI expansion. Hence the potential of my project to apply beyond the climate emergency.

Current paper projects

[Drafts available upon request]

Climate Ethics

Democratic Theory

AI Ethics

Philosophy of Race

Philosophy of Race

Ethics of Activism

Democracy and Climate Activism

Examines whether climate activism, even when it is harmful, may be permissible as a way to defend democracy. Focuses on the case of ecotage against fossil fuel infrastructure.

Presented at Stanford’s Political Theory Workshop, APA Meeting PAcific 2024, and ISEE 21st Annual Summer Meeeting.

Justifying Prison Abolition: Racism as a Homeostatic System

Examines whether the idea that racism is best theorized as a “homeostatic system” is action-guiding for anti-racist activists, especially prison abolitionists.

Presented at the 2022 UMSL Philosophy of Activism Conference and the 2022 Latinx Philosophy Conference.

Towards a Theory of Proxies (for Race)

What is the relation, if any, between features coded in a machine learning model, like education or zip code, and racial categories, which may not be encoded in the model, such that decisions made on the basis the given feature count as decisions made on the basis of race? I survey four responses to this question and offer my own theory of proxies for race.

Presented at AI and Date Ethics Summer School at Northeastern University and Cornell’s Ethics and Politics in Computing Colloquium.